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even notice—to evade the well-established materiality 
requirement, which is designed to protect tenants from 
losing their homes and businesses for trivial breaches. In 
rent control jurisdictions, the decision might provide a 
convenient means to evict tenants paying below-market 
rent, in order to raise rents to market levels—thereby 
undermining the ordinance’s requirement that landlords 
have just cause to evict. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant, chap 
7. 
There are many other California court of appeal 
decisions not allowing an eviction for a trivial breach of 
the lease. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant §§8.58–8.60, 7.57. 
Our Supreme Court Tackles 
Greenhouse Gas Analysis in EIRs 
Alan Ramo 
Introduction 
The California Supreme Court probably surprised a 
few observers when it rejected the California Department 
of Fish and Wildlife’s greenhouse gas analysis of the 
Newhall Ranch development in its recent decision in 
Center for Biological Diversity v Department of Fish & 
Wildlife (2015) 62 C4th 204 (reported at p 13). State 
appellate courts have been rather deferential to challenges 
to the implementation of California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act (known as AB 32). See Our Children’s 
Earth Found. v California Air Resources Bd. (2015) 234 
CA4th 870; Association of Irritated Residents v Air 
Resources Bd. (2012) 206 CA4th 1487, reported at 35 
CEB RPLR 135 (Sept. 2012). Courts hesitate to wade into 
technical expert analyses such as greenhouse gas 
emissions analysis. 
Nevertheless, the supreme court’s large majority (5–2) 
did not hesitate to dive into the CEQA “significance” 
analysis contained in the project’s environmental impact 
report (EIR) and find a fundamental flaw in the project’s 
attempt to use as guidance the state Air Resources 
Board’s (ARB) approach to greenhouse gas regulation. 
Perhaps even more alarming to proponents of greenhouse 
gas-emitting projects, the court, while accepting ARB’s 
AB 32 emission reduction goal as a CEQA “threshold” 
for significance, at the same time questioned the 
threshold’s continued utility after 2020, when more 
dramatic reductions will be required under state climate 
change laws. Lurking in the court’s willingness to 
question the project-level compliance with the AB 32 
significance threshold calculation is the court’s skepticism 
toward game-playing with such baselines. For an 
analogous situation, though not cited by the court, see 
Neighbors for Smart Rail v Exposition Metro Line Constr. 
Auth. (2013) 57 C4th 439, discussed by Golden Gate 
University Professor Paul S. Kibel in Sea Level Rise, 
Saltwater Intrusion and Endangered Fisheries—Shifting 
Baselines for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan, 38 
Environs: Envt’l L & Pol’y J 259, 260 (Spring 2015). See 
also Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and 
Who Loses?, 20 Hastings W-NW J Envt’l L & Pol’y 109 
(2014). 
Analysis 
Because this case was brought under CEQA, the 
court’s analysis is through a CEQA lens rather than 
simply a policy analysis. The legal issue before the court 
was whether the EIR properly analyzed whether the 
greenhouse gases from the proposed development 
(anticipated to house more than 50,000 people) are 
significant and thus require mitigation. Alternatively, if 
there are unavoidable impacts after deploying all feasible 
and reasonable mitigations, a statement of overriding 
considerations would be required if the project’s benefits 
are deemed to outweigh its impacts. 
The court first analyzed what kind of a cumulative 
impact problem is presented by greenhouse gas emissions 
in California. It recognized that California emissions have 
global impact and that any individual project’s impacts 
are uncertain. However, the question was whether this 
project, together with present and future projects, is 
cumulatively considerable. The court then determined that 
it was appropriate to reference state policies that are 
attempting to address California’s reasonable contribution 
to a solution to climate change, which led it to accept 
ARB’s plan to achieve AB 32’s goal of a reduction to 
1990 emission levels as a suitable significance threshold. 
That plan requires a 29 percent reduction of emissions 
from what the level of emissions would have been in 
2020—the so-called “business as usual” scenario. In 
developing its analysis, the court cited extensively to an 
article authored by Sandy Crockett, the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management District’s counsel, published by the 
GGU Environmental Law Journal—an article every 
practitioner representing a project proponent or opponent 
should review. See Crockett, Addressing the Significance 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under CEQA: California’s 
Search for Regulatory Certainty in an Uncertain World, 4 
Golden Gate U Envt’l LJ 203 (July 2011). 
The court found that while the project would add 
greenhouse gases to the environment, the issue was 
whether the added emissions were less than what would 
happen without the project. After all, the population that 
would live in the city would live somewhere else; 
somewhere else may lead to even more emissions. 
Further, the project should be designed to contribute its 
appropriate share of reductions consistent with ARB’s AB 
32 plan. 
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But here is the rub: Although one might simplistically 
leap to the conclusion (as the Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (DFW) and the appellate court in this case did) 
that any project that achieves a reduction greater than 29 
percent from a business-as-usual scenario is not 
significant (Newhall projected a 31 percent reduction 
from its assumed business-as-usual calculation), it turns 
out this determination is more complicated. 
First, what is the business-as-usual scenario for the 
population that would end up living in Newhall? That 
turns out to be a somewhat murky question. While the 
minority was ready to hold up their hands and say, “That 
is one for the experts,” the majority said that, as with all 
CEQA findings, this must be explained with reasoned 
analysis that is based on facts. The court here found that 
DFW failed to do so and suggested that, in fact, by 
making unsupported assumptions about the impacts of the 
density of the project versus the density of living sites for 
the business-as-usual population used by ARB, the 
agency may have skewed the result. 
Even more importantly, the court recognized that 
ARB’s business-as-usual scenario and its 29 percent 
reduction were an across-the-board average. That is, for 
example, there may be some projects in the future that can 
be expected to reduce their emissions by only 15 percent 
while others can be reasonably expected to reduce by 45 
percent. The fact that this project was reducing its 
emissions by 31 percent may or may not undermine the 
business-as-usual projections, depending on ARB’s 
assumptions and projections. The court argued that 
applying ARB’s projected reduction to an individual 
project requires a project-specific analysis of how the 
project fits into the statewide analysis. 
The court identified at least three ways that ARB might 
correct its analysis: 
• Evaluate the assumptions behind ARB’s business-as-
usual analysis and link those to the individual project. 
This approach may or may not be as simple as it 
sounds and would clearly require expert analysis. 
• Demonstrate the project is using mitigation measures 
consistent with requirements under AB 32. The court 
noted that these requirements may be limited to 
specific impacts. It would be better if local or 
regional agencies developed greenhouse gas plans 
consistent with AB 32 that would incorporate the 
project. If these agencies have not created sufficiently 
detailed and comprehensive plans, this route may be 
limited. 
• To the extent regional agencies have developed 
numerical thresholds for individual project 
greenhouse gas emissions (the example used by the 
court is BAAQMD’s thresholds), abide by those 
numbers. If the project exceeds those thresholds, or 
no thresholds have been adopted, then the project 
may adopt all feasible mitigation measures and, if 
impacts are still significant, issue a statement of 
overriding considerations. Considering that Newhall’s 
project already has a statement of overriding 
considerations for other impacts, this may be the 
simplest and most defensible approach, especially 
given Newhall’s representation it has designed a 
green project with the latest and best mitigations. 
Conclusion 
The larger implications of this decision are quite 
profound. A simple analysis based on the ARB 29 percent 
reduction calculation will not be sufficient. Further, the 
court opined that this figure may soon be outdated; far 
greater reductions will be required for large greenhouse 
gas emitters. Indeed, the state has new goals for 2030; the 
original Schwarzenegger climate change Executive Order 
(S-03–05, June 2005) called for more drastic reductions 
by 2050. 
Perhaps most importantly, the California Supreme 
Court’s majority has shown it is not afraid to engage in 
the more technical aspects of greenhouse gas-emission 
regulatory programs and baseline and business-as-usual 
calculations. While it can be expected that the court will 
show due deference to agencies such as ARB, 
fundamental gaps or gaming in the use of baselines or 
projections that could undermine environmental 
protections will not automatically be ignored. 





In Buchanan v Soto (2015) 241 CA4th 1353 (reported 
at p 17), two weeks after Diana Buchanan filed suit to 
collect money that Maria Soto owed her, Maria 
transferred her interest in her Olive Avenue properties to 
one of her co-owners, Ramon Soto, thereby ostensibly 
putting it beyond the reach of Buchanan’s subsequent 
efforts to collect on the money judgment that she was later 
to obtain. Ramon Soto was not only Maria’s husband, but 
had also been deported to Mexico (and appears to have 
been hiding), making it difficult for Buchanan to serve 
him in her action to set aside Maria’s conveyance. The 
case mainly involves jurisdictional questions, which I 
have asked my colleague, Marc Greenberg, to comment 
on, but I have also used the decision as a vehicle for 
allowing me to update readers on some new developments 
in fraudulent conveyance law. (As a mortgage lawyer, I 
